Jul 26, 2023 "The recent verdict in a Quebec court case of Gabriel Sohier-Chaput, a 36-year-old Montrealer who wrote articles willfully promoting hate against Jews in The Daily Stormer, a prominent American Neo-Nazi website, has sparked an urgent and necessary conversation about hate speech and inadequate punitive measures in addressing this issue.
Sohier-Chaput’s article entitled "Canada: Nazis Trigger Jews by Putting Up Posters On Ch--k Church," used antisemitic memes and editorialized commentary to celebrate neo-Nazi posters affixed to a bus stop in British Columbia. It also mocked a Holocaust survivor who was interviewed about the incident calling him an "oven-dodger," and called for "non-stop Nazism, everywhere, until the very streets are flooded with the tears of our enemies."
Judge Manlio Del Negro, the presiding judge in the case, questioned the Crown’s proposed three-month sentence for a man found guilty of promoting hatred against Jews, raising a critical concern: does such a lenient sentence trivialize the gravity and danger of hate speech?
A precursor oftentimes to discrimination, harassment, and physical violence, hate speech poses significant dangers not only to targeted individuals or communities, but to the fundamental values of our society. Hate speech is a destructive force that not only undermines individual dignity, but also threatens the fabric of societal harmony.
In a multicultural nation like Canada, the propagation of hate speech stands in stark contrast to our core values and legal principles, particularly the right to freedom from discrimination, under Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Of particular concern, we know that online hate can turn into real-world violence. Left unchecked, this is how antisemitism is normalized and weaponized.
The proposed three-month jail sentence by the Crown in this case is woefully insufficient. Such a brief punishment downplays the serious nature of the crime and fails to serve as an effective deterrent against similar criminal behavior. Sentencing in a criminal case should have multiple objectives: punishing the offender, deterring others, and providing an opportunity for rehabilitation.
Such a lenient sentence lacks proportionality as it sends an incorrect message about the seriousness of the offence and fails to deter others, who see that the consequences for such crimes are minimal, from committing similar offences. Accordingly, this sentence may actually embolden more hate speech and more hate crimes. In addition, such short sentencing prevents criminals from preparing adequately for their reintegration into society, therefore casting serious doubts on the authenticity of their rehabilitation and posing serious risks to the public, especially members of Canada’s Jewish community who remain the most targeted religious minority for hate crimes in our country. To his credit, Judge Del Negro called Sohier-Chaput "extremely dangerous to the public."
Indeed, the Quebec court case provides a crucial opportunity to examine the efficacy of our current sentencing practices. In this context, the recommended three-month jail sentence sends a troubling message that the harm caused by hate speech is trivial and not worthy of greater sentencing and could set a dangerous precedent. Furthermore, it fails to recognize the profound societal and individual impacts of hate speech, in this case of the Jewish community, and risks the trivialization of this grave offence.
Hate speech is a serious offence that requires a robust response from our justice system. With sentencing taking place on September 22, the sentencing guidelines must be reassessed to reflect the gravity of hate speech so that we can strengthen the protection of our diverse society and reaffirm our commitment to upholding the values of inclusivity and tolerance that define our nation. This case serves as a clarion call of the potential harm that hate speech poses and our responsibility to respond appropriately, fostering the hope that it will catalyze a deeper examination of hate speech penalties in Canada.
Jade Levitt, Director of Quebec, HonestReporting Canada and Samuel Malamud, Social Media Intern, HonestReporting Canada
"Jul 26, 2023 "The recent verdict in a Quebec court case of Gabriel Sohier-Chaput, a 36-year-old Montrealer who wrote articles willfully promoting hate against Jews in The Daily Stormer, a prominent American Neo-Nazi website, has sparked an urgent and necessary conversation about hate speech and inadequate punitive measures in addressing this issue....
A precursor oftentimes to discrimination, harassment, and physical violence, hate speech poses significant dangers not only to targeted individuals or communities, but to the fundamental values of our society. Hate speech is a destructive force that not only undermines individual dignity, but also threatens the fabric of societal harmony.
In a multicultural nation like Canada, the propagation of hate speech stands in stark contrast to our core values and legal principles, particularly the right to freedom from discrimination, under Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Of particular concern, we know that online hate can turn into real-world violence. Left unchecked, this is how antisemitism is normalized and weaponized.
The proposed three-month jail sentence by the Crown in this case is woefully insufficient. Such a brief punishment downplays the serious nature of the crime and fails to serve as an effective deterrent against similar criminal behavior. Sentencing in a criminal case should have multiple objectives: punishing the offender, deterring others, and providing an opportunity for rehabilitation.
Such a lenient sentence lacks proportionality as it sends an incorrect message about the seriousness of the offence and fails to deter others, who see that the consequences for such crimes are minimal, from committing similar offences. Accordingly, this sentence may actually embolden more hate speech and more hate crimes. In addition, such short sentencing prevents criminals from preparing adequately for their reintegration into society, therefore casting serious doubts on the authenticity of their rehabilitation and posing serious risks to the public, especially members of Canada’s Jewish community who remain the most targeted religious minority for hate crimes in our country. To his credit, Judge Del Negro called Sohier-Chaput "extremely dangerous to the public."
Indeed, the Quebec court case provides a crucial opportunity to examine the efficacy of our current sentencing practices. In this context, the recommended three-month jail sentence sends a troubling message that the harm caused by hate speech is trivial and not worthy of greater sentencing and could set a dangerous precedent. Furthermore, it fails to recognize the profound societal and individual impacts of hate speech, in this case of the Jewish community, and risks the trivialization of this grave offence.
Hate speech is a serious offence that requires a robust response from our justice system. With sentencing taking place on September 22, the sentencing guidelines must be reassessed to reflect the gravity of hate speech so that we can strengthen the protection of our diverse society and reaffirm our commitment to upholding the values of inclusivity and tolerance that define our nation. This case serves as a clarion call of the potential harm that hate speech poses and our responsibility to respond appropriately, fostering the hope that it will catalyze a deeper examination of hate speech penalties in Canada.
Jade Levitt, Director of Quebec, HonestReporting Canada and Samuel Malamud, Social Media Intern, HonestReporting Canada
By Stacey A. Gibson [Selected excerpt] Link to full post is below.
"Tyrannies of silence tear through educational institutions with searing ferocity. In hallways and classroom corners and cloaked under the din of the cafeteria hum, many faculty, staff, and administrators of color exchange knowing glances, shaking heads, and cold stories—rushed and whispered—about the race-based treacheries they see, hear, deflect, and absorb in their schools. So often, these same people, especially those who identify as black, are expected to remain silent, internalize race-based trauma, deescalate and/or sanitize situations, and respond in "gentle ways" that do not offend or disrupt the oppressor. Some school leaders create and offer adults and students of color "safe spaces" to meet and "talk about issues." Although important and helpful to some, this retreat and regroup practice reinforces the unspoken but deeply held notion that people of color are to work quietly in these spaces to hold themselves together, repair wounds, and emerge ready to reenter the institution on the institution's terms.
Systemic silences around issues of race, whiteness, and equity in schools sustain a status quo where whites maintain privilege while re-traumatizing people of color and sapping any efforts at meaningful, transformative interventions. Instead of sanctifying silence, use this guide to stay vigilant and committed to exposing and disrupting the subtle forms of oppression at work in your school.
How to Spot and Disrupt Six Silences of Inertia
"I don't know where to begin." Many white educators insist they have no idea where to locate resources about "this stuff," even though there are hundreds of books, thousands of essays and articles, and dozens of reputable sites housing scaffolded, sequenced, highly appropriate material on race, oppression, and equity. Some school administrators set aside funds to attend conferences and institutes to help reframe curricula and provide meaningful professional development, yet some educators are still allowed to practice strategic disengagement around racial equity using this pattern of silence.
Disrupt this silence by visiting sites like Teaching Tolerance, EDUCOLOR, and Radical Teacherfor relevant plans, points of reference, community support, and opportunities for meaningful collaboration.
"The social studies teacher will deal with it." Some (usually but not always) white educators avoid issues of race and equity by insisting that "the humanities teachers will take care of 'that stuff'" and "this race stuff is not doable in math and science." These educators often assert that the content they teach is "neutral" and they would have to "give up something important" to make room for "that stuff."
Disrupt this silence by participating in your local Rethinking Schools' Teachers for Social Justice groups and conferences. Examine and articulate the way privilege affords individuals and whole groups the chance to opt out of opportunities for growth on issues of race and equity.
"But I've already acknowledged my privilege." Many educators mistake declarations of white privilege awareness for a moment of transformational change and meaningful intervention. Generally, once white folks recognize and articulate awareness of their privilege, there seems to be a significant drop off in the stamina needed to engage in constructive, long-term change. It's as if the privilege recognition party occurs, the party ends, and the guest of honor disappears from the party, from their own words, and from their own opportunity to grow.
Disrupt this silence by studying Shakti Butler's film Mirrors of Privilege, either individually or with a professional learning community. Learn to practice race-based self-awareness and self-respect. Find those white people who ally with and support other white people who are willing to share their healing practices around their white identity. Then, confidently address the race-based repair work that is so obviously, deeply needed."...
OER18 Conference keynote by Lorna M. Campbell. In this talk Lorna explores how the OER Conference has examined and renegotiate what “OER” means over the years, and how this has reflected her own journey as an open education practitioner. She also looks at what we can do to ensure that open education is diverse, inclusive and participatory, and using innovative examples from the University of Edinburgh, she explores how we can engage students in open education practice and the co-creation of OER.
HOME WHO WE ARE Promoting Africa’s growth and economic development by championing citizen inclusion and increased cooperation and integration of African states. About the African Union Overview Member States Constitutive Act AU Symbols & Anthem AU Languages AU Holidays AU Handbook AU Structure &...
Purpose-The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions of graduate students about the need for a multicultural education course at doctoral level in a mid-sized higher education public institution in Southwest Florida.
International Conference & Exhibition on ICT for Education, Training and Skills Development for everyone concerned with developing eLearning capacities in Africa.
The mission of eLearning Africa is to share their knowledge and experience of technology enhanced learning. It stands as one of the most extensive professional community network dedicated to showcasing African proficiency and talent in the education to the world. Their objective is to showcase and support sustainable education solutions through comprehensive training and educational initiatives. eLearning Africa is a firm believer for the integration of digital technologies, including computers, mobile devices, and the internet. And my favorite part is that they raise awareness and providing essential support for the capacity development and training of human resources.
Equipped with Miami Linguistic Readers, Camino de la Escuela, and my own ingenuity, my young multilingual learners and I dived into what we believed were sound biliteracy practices. These leveled reading programs developed eons ago were lifeblood to a novice teacher like me who had been trained in Spanish as a “foreign language.” Although in the mid-1970s Illinois was one of the first states to inaugurate “transitional bilingual education,” there were no endorsed university programs nor empirical research on biliteracy that had been conducted in the US.
Was I qualified to teach literacy in one language, let alone two? Absolutely not, but I had a wonderful relationship with my students and their families and together we reached great heights. Over the years and several degrees later, as I continued my career as a bilingual teacher and coordinator, I became subject to any number of literacy initiatives. All of these were touted as the cure-all for the ongoing decline in national reading scores, in particular for minoritized students (as determined by large-scale achievement tests in English). I eventually became disillusioned with vacillating literacy mandates that had little applicability to my multilingual learners.
As a dedicated educator, I had had it instilled in me that literacy is the hallmark of education and the unwavering mark of success in school. Although the pendulum of teaching models and methodologies has swayed over the years, the prevailing conceptualization of literacy seems to have remained steadfast. Historically, literacy has been equated with the following features. It has been: Text bound, dependent on print Reflective of standard language Restricted to rule-governed forms of language Monoglossic (where language is divorced from context and monolingualism is valued over multilingualism) and monocultural
Despite this portrayal of literacy in the mainstream US, the reading wars over the most effective pedagogy for all students continue. Basically, for me, this conflict boils down to a polarity in linguistic thinking. Structural linguistics, which currently manifests as the science of reading, is perceived as a habit-formation process. It emphasizes language as a bound system of rules that consists of explicit connections among sounds, words, and sentences. At the other end of the continuum is sociocultural linguistics, which encompasses multiliteracies. It envisions the three Ls, literacy, language, and learning, as social activities that are situationally bound and geared to function, the overall purpose or meaning of a message. Sensitive to context, languages, and cultures, multiliteracies encompass a more comprehensive view of multilingual learners’ positionality as they seamlessly move across a variety of spaces. The Backdrop of Multiliteracies
The new millennium brought substantive change to the world of K–12 literacy that reverberates to this day. The National Reading Panel report of 2000 established five pillars of reading instruction—phonemic awareness, phonics, fluency, vocabulary, and comprehension—which became the basis of federal literacy policy for the Reading First initiative under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002. Concomitantly, this reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act stripped bilingualism from its pages, thereby also creating a de facto monolingual national language policy (Menken, 2008).
In 2006, “Developing Literacy in Second-Language Learners: Report of the National Literacy Panel on Language-Minority Children and Youth” (August and Shanahan, 2006) presented an extensive review of literacy-related research for this ever-growing group of students. Interestingly, it reiterates the findings of the prior panel, confirming the pillars of early literacy practices. However, it does go further in acknowledging that research on literacy instruction in the primary language has a positive effect on multilingual learners’ literacy achievement in English. Even though this analysis of literacy research centered on multilingual learners, it has been criticized as being filtered through a monolingual lens (Escamilla, 2009).
From Literacy to Multiliteracies
During this same time frame, the educational landscape was being transformed by a series of outside forces, which continue to inform the landscape to this day. Let’s reflect on how our lives have been altered over the past two decades. Radical changes have been brought about by two forces: 1) the sociocultural impact of natural phenomena, and 2) technological advances. These include (in no particular order): Catastrophic events (9/11/2001, mass shootings, war) Natural disasters (e.g., destructive hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes) Physical and mental health crises Racial and religious unrest Technology tools (e.g., Chromebook, the tablet, cell phones) Social media (e.g., TikTok, Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) One-way (e.g., YouTube, Google, gaming) and two-way communication (e.g., email, texting, Zoom, Skype, WhatsApp, Viber)
How can we continue to superimpose traditional views of literacy onto a world that has undergone such a metamorphosis? Where do digital technologies that blend text, sound, and imagery fit into a narrow definition of literacy as we engage in social networking, blogging, podcasting, video making, even navigating a website? How can we envision and make sense of different content areas, such as when we build interactive maps and infographics or take virtual tours? How can we defend monolingual pedagogies when 70% of the world is multilingual and multicultural? Multiliteracies represent a relatively unique way of thinking and acting about the teaching of literacy within a social context for learning (New London Group, 1996). Born from a dual presence of exploding technology-associated text forms and increased linguistic and cultural diversity, multiliteracies expand the notion of literacy beyond the printed word to recognize different varieties of language and other sources of meaning. This shift also explicitly extends literacy from inside school to encompass students’ experiences at home and in the community. In essence, multiliteracies underscore how education must adapt to meet the needs of our multimodal society (Tricamo, 2021). Multiliteracies offer varied ways to interpret multiple communication channels to meet the diversifying interests of students, especially those of our multilingual learners with their enriched linguistic and cultural understandings.
As mentioned, there are two unique aspects of multiliteracies. The first encompasses the influences of culture, gender, life experience, and subject-matter expertise on social contexts that enable learners to decipher different patterns of meaning and apply varying perspectives to new learning. Thus, with multiliteracies, every meaning exchange is considered a cross-cultural one that is sensitive to and reflective of the world of multilingual learners.
The second aspect of multiliteracies is connected to the characteristics of communications media and the new information age. That is, we make meaning in ways that are increasingly multimodal, where written-linguistic modes intersect with oral, visual, audio, gestural, tactile, and spatial patterns. Expanding literacy to multiliteracies advantages multilingual learners, not only by being inclusive of the social and cultural contexts of learning but also by being more accessible to students through a variety of inter-exchangeable and combinable modes. The figure of intersecting circles is a graphic representation of the two “multi”s of multiliteracies (see https://newlearningonline.com/multiliteracies/visual-overview). In it, we see the interface between one’s life worlds (in social and cultural situations) and their many modes of communication. The interaction of different forms of communication with how they are socially situated foregrounds the interpretative nature of multiliteracies.
Two Major Aspects of Multiliteracies Multiliteracies for Multilingual Learners
Simply stated, multiliteracies allow multilingual learners to comprehend and decipher the world from varying viewpoints. Their languages, cultures, and experiences are intertwined within a wide range of literacies and literacy practices (e.g., reading and writing along with gestures, visual representation, and digital communication). In school, multiliteracies are not confined to one class, though they are most typically associated with language arts, but in fact are integrated into every content area.
There is another set of “multi”s we may wish to apply to multilingual learners. As shown in the figure on the next page, we can see multiliteracies as an umbrella for both multiple languages, including their interaction during translanguaging (the natural dynamic flow and exchange between languages), and multimodalities (the combination of sensory and communicative modes to evoke meaning). The learning potential of these interrelated resources that are engrained in multiliteracies is enormous for multilingual learners and their teachers. For example, multilingual learners who have opportunities to delve into content by viewing a video with bilingual captioning that comes with an accompanying pictograph are afforded access to a combination of visual, auditory, and textual modes.
Adding ‘Multi’s to Literacies, Lingualism, and Modalities for Multilingual Learners
Adapted from Gottlieb, 2021
In essence, in navigating multiliteracy spaces, multilingual learners are advantaged. Classrooms that intertwine multilingualism, multimodalities, and multiliteracies into curriculum, instruction, and assessment are privileged. Here… Multiliteracies encompass multilingual learners’ understanding and creation of meaning from their interaction with multimodalities and multiple languages, including translanguaging practices, as vehicles for furthering learning. Multiliteracies, by being inclusive of and embracing linguistic and cultural diversity, help shape the positive identities of multilingual learners. Multiliteracies tap the language resources of multilingual learners along with different combinations of modalities—audio, visual, graphic, oral, kinesthetic, linguistic—to optimize literacy and learning experiences as the students interact with the world (Castro and Gottlieb, 2021). Multiliteracies offer authentic choices for multilingual learners to pursue a range of pathways where multimodal resources combine with content and language to fortify deep learning. Multiliteracies act as a springboard for educators who leverage bilingualism/multilingualism as an underlying trait and strength of multilingual learners as they crisscross multiple languages and cultures. The Promise of Multiliteracies for Multilingual Learners
As a globally interconnected multilingual society, we are constantly expanding our dependence on technologies and related digital literacies. As a result, the rise of new literacies and multiliteracies has been constant, with everyone having to navigate increasingly richer and more complex media. Case in point, more and more secondary students are leading “tech-saturated lives,” with 95% using the internet, 78% having a cell phone, 80% having a computer, and 81% relying on social networking—and these data are pre-COVID (Watters, 2014). Given these facts, along with our witnessing of a multilingual turn where we have been reassessing the critical role of multilingualism in teaching and learning (May, 2013), multiliteracies should have staying power in our classrooms and schools.
Decades have passed since the inception of my career. The reading wars continue to rage and the literacy pendulum seems to be in perpetual motion. Our definition of literacy may have expanded, but to what extent have we witnessed research-based advances in (bi)literacy instruction for multilingual learners? I still await the magic bullet.
References
August, D., and Shanahan, T. (2006). (Eds.). “Developing Literacy in Second Language Learners: Report of the National Literacy Panel on Language-Minority Children and Youth.” Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Castro, M., and Gottlieb, M. (2021). “Multiliteracies: A glimpse into language arts bilingual classrooms.” WIDA Focus Bulletin. Wisconsin Center for Education Research, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Escamilla, K. (2009). “English Language Learners: Developing literacy in second-language learners – Report of the National Literacy Panel on Language-Minority Children and Youth.” Journal of Literacy Research, 41, 432–452. Gottlieb, M. (2021). Classroom Assessment in Multiple Languages: A Handbook for Teachers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin. May, S. (2013). (Ed). The Multilingual Turn: Implications for SLA, TESOL, and Bilingual Education. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge. Menken, K. (2008). English Learners Left Behind: Standardized Testing as Language Policy. Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters. Tricamo, L. (2021). Multiliteracies, Multimodalities, and Social Studies Education. Proceedings of GREAT Day, 2020, article 21. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=proceedings-of-great-day Watters, A. (2014). “New Literacies in the Classroom.” http://hackeducation.com/2014/11/11/new-literacies-in-the-classroom
Margo Gottlieb, co-founder and lead developer of WIDA at the Wisconsin Center of Education Research, University of Wisconsin-Madison, has had a long-standing career in multilingual education. Having presented and written extensively on classroom assessment for multilingual learners (see https://us.corwin.com/en-us/nam/author/margo-gottlieb), she is happy for readers to contact her at margogottlieb@gmail.com.
"...Historically, literacy has been equated with the following features. It has been: Text bound, dependent on print Reflective of standard language Restricted to rule-governed forms of language Monoglossic (where language is divorced from context and monolingualism is valued over multilingualism) and monocultural
Despite this portrayal of literacy in the mainstream US, the reading wars over the most effective pedagogy for all students continue. Basically, for me, this conflict boils down to a polarity in linguistic thinking. Structural linguistics, which currently manifests as the science of reading, is perceived as a habit-formation process. It emphasizes language as a bound system of rules that consists of explicit connections among sounds, words, and sentences. At the other end of the continuum is sociocultural linguistics, which encompasses multiliteracies. It envisions the three Ls, literacy, language, and learning, as social activities that are situationally bound and geared to function, the overall purpose or meaning of a message. Sensitive to context, languages, and cultures, multiliteracies encompass a more comprehensive view of multilingual learners’ positionality as they seamlessly move across a variety of spaces. The Backdrop of Multiliteracies
The new millennium brought substantive change to the world of K–12 literacy that reverberates to this day. The National Reading Panel report of 2000 established five pillars of reading instruction—phonemic awareness, phonics, fluency, vocabulary, and comprehension—which became the basis of federal literacy policy for the Reading First initiative under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002. Concomitantly, this reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act stripped bilingualism from its pages, thereby also creating a de facto monolingual national language policy (Menken, 2008).
In 2006, “Developing Literacy in Second-Language Learners: Report of the National Literacy Panel on Language-Minority Children and Youth” (August and Shanahan, 2006) presented an extensive review of literacy-related research for this ever-growing group of students. Interestingly, it reiterates the findings of the prior panel, confirming the pillars of early literacy practices. However, it does go further in acknowledging that research on literacy instruction in the primary language has a positive effect on multilingual learners’ literacy achievement in English. Even though this analysis of literacy research centered on multilingual learners, it has been criticized as being filtered through a monolingual lens (Escamilla, 2009).
From Literacy to Multiliteracies
During this same time frame, the educational landscape was being transformed by a series of outside forces, which continue to inform the landscape to this day. Let’s reflect on how our lives have been altered over the past two decades. Radical changes have been brought about by two forces: 1) the sociocultural impact of natural phenomena, and 2) technological advances. These include (in no particular order): Catastrophic events (9/11/2001, mass shootings, war) Natural disasters (e.g., destructive hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes) Physical and mental health crises Racial and religious unrest Technology tools (e.g., Chromebook, the tablet, cell phones) Social media (e.g., TikTok, Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) One-way (e.g., YouTube, Google, gaming) and two-way communication (e.g., email, texting, Zoom, Skype, WhatsApp, Viber)
How can we continue to superimpose traditional views of literacy onto a world that has undergone such a metamorphosis? Where do digital technologies that blend text, sound, and imagery fit into a narrow definition of literacy as we engage in social networking, blogging, podcasting, video making, even navigating a website? How can we envision and make sense of different content areas, such as when we build interactive maps and infographics or take virtual tours? How can we defend monolingual pedagogies when 70% of the world is multilingual and multicultural?
Multiliteracies represent a relatively unique way of thinking and acting about the teaching of literacy within a social context for learning (New London Group, 1996). Born from a dual presence of exploding technology-associated text forms and increased linguistic and cultural diversity, multiliteracies expand the notion of literacy beyond the printed word to recognize different varieties of language and other sources of meaning. This shift also explicitly extends literacy from inside school to encompass students’ experiences at home and in the community. In essence, multiliteracies underscore how education must adapt to meet the needs of our multimodal society (Tricamo, 2021).
Multiliteracies offer varied ways to interpret multiple communication channels to meet the diversifying interests of students, especially those of our multilingual learners with their enriched linguistic and cultural understandings.
As mentioned, there are two unique aspects of multiliteracies. The first encompasses the influences of culture, gender, life experience, and subject-matter expertise on social contexts that enable learners to decipher different patterns of meaning and apply varying perspectives to new learning. Thus, with multiliteracies, every meaning exchange is considered a cross-cultural one that is sensitive to and reflective of the world of multilingual learners.
The second aspect of multiliteracies is connected to the characteristics of communications media and the new information age. That is, we make meaning in ways that are increasingly multimodal, where written-linguistic modes intersect with oral, visual, audio, gestural, tactile, and spatial patterns. Expanding literacy to multiliteracies advantages multilingual learners, not only by being inclusive of the social and cultural contexts of learning but also by being more accessible to students through a variety of inter-exchangeable and combinable modes. The figure of intersecting circles is a graphic representation of the two “multi”s of multiliteracies (see https://newlearningonline.com/multiliteracies/visual-overview). In it, we see the interface between one’s life worlds (in social and cultural situations) and their many modes of communication. The interaction of different forms of communication with how they are socially situated foregrounds the interpretative nature of multiliteracies.
...
Multiliteracies for Multilingual Learners
Simply stated, multiliteracies allow multilingual learners to comprehend and decipher the world from varying viewpoints. Their languages, cultures, and experiences are intertwined within a wide range of literacies and literacy practices (e.g., reading and writing along with gestures, visual representation, and digital communication). In school, multiliteracies are not confined to one class, though they are most typically associated with language arts, but in fact are integrated into every content area.
There is another set of “multi”s we may wish to apply to multilingual learners. [...W]e can see multiliteracies as an umbrella for both multiple languages, including their interaction during translanguaging (the natural dynamic flow and exchange between languages), and multimodalities (the combination of sensory and communicative modes to evoke meaning). The learning potential of these interrelated resources that are engrained in multiliteracies is enormous for multilingual learners and their teachers. For example, multilingual learners who have opportunities to delve into content by viewing a video with bilingual captioning that comes with an accompanying pictograph are afforded access to a combination of visual, auditory, and textual modes."
Cultural feedback styles Students yearn for constructive feedback. However, some feedback can be discouraging if not well received by the students. There is individual variation in how students are used to getting feedback and
Via sidmartin
In my book, Nordic Ideology, I outline six new forms of politics that I feel must become institutionalized parts of societies across the world for the core challenges of late modern life to be properly managed. One of these I call Gemeinschaft Politics — “Gemeinschaft” being a German word that sociologists use to denote the aspects of society that are not formalized into rules, regulations, and bureaucracies. It’s the informal weave of relationships in society: friendships, family and courting practices, inter-citizen trust and solidarity, religious, cultural, and ethnic or racial relations. It’s the politics of “fellowship” — the active and deliberate work to heal, develop, and improve upon such informal but crucial aspects of society.
I go on to outline four positions on gender/sexuality as well as ethnic/racial relations in society. In the latter case, I suggest the following positions that I hold can be observed in societies across the world:
Artist Brian Peterson paints his neighbors experiencing homelessness and uses the money from sold portraits to support them in achieving their hopes and …
In a recent interview Noam Chomsky shares his thoughts on ChatGPT and why he feels that its a wakeup call for our educational model.
In a recent interview, renowned linguist and cognitive scientist Noam Chomsky gave his thoughts on the rise of ChatGPT, and its effect on education. What he had to say wasn't favorable. As more and more educators struggle with how to combat plagiarism and the use of these chatbots in the classroom, Chomsky gives a clear viewpoint. For him, the key all lies in how students are taught, and, currently, our educational system is pushing students toward ChatGPT and other shortcuts.
“I don’t think [ChatGPT] has anything to do with education,” Chomsky tells interviewer Thijmen Sprakel of EduKitchen. “I think it’s undermining it. ChatGPT is basically high-tech plagiarism.” The challenge for educators, according to Chomsky, is to create interest in the topics that they teach so that students will be motivated to learn, rather than trying to avoid doing the work.
Chomsky, who spent a large part of his career teaching at MIT, felt strongly that his students wouldn't have turned to AI to complete their coursework because they were invested in the material. If students are relying on ChatGPT, Chomsky says it’s “a sign that the educational system is failing. If students aren’t interested, they’ll find a way around it.”
The American intellectual strongly feels like the current educational model of “teaching to test” has created an environment where students are bored. In turn, the boredom turns to avoidance, and ChatGPT becomes an easy way to avoid the education.
While some argue that chatbots like ChatGPT can be a useful educational tool, Chomsky has a much different opinion. He feels that these natural language systems “may be of value for some things, but it's not obvious what.”
Meanwhile, it appears that schools are scrambling to figure out how to counteract the use of ChatGPT. Many schools have banned ChatGPT on school devices and networks, and educators are adjusting their teaching styles. Some are turning to more in-class essays, while others are looking at how they can incorporate the technology into the classroom.
It will be interesting to see if the rise of chatbots helps steer us toward a new teaching philosophy and away from the “teaching to test” method that has become the driving force of modern education. It's the kind of education that Chomsky says was “ridiculed during the Enlightenment,” and so indirectly, this new technology may force schools to rethink how they ask students to apply their knowledge.
Listen to Noam Chomsky speak about the rise of ChatGPT in education.
h/t: [Open Culture]
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AI Chatbots Now Let You Talk to Historical Figures Like Shakespeare and Andy Warhol
JESSICA STEWART
Jessica Stewart is a Contributing Writer and Digital Media Specialist for My Modern Met, as well as a curator and art historian. Since 2020, she is also one of the co-hosts of the My Modern Met Top Artist Podcast. She earned her MA in Renaissance Studies from University College London and now lives in Rome, Italy. She cultivated expertise in street art which led to the purchase of her photographic archive by the Treccani Italian Encyclopedia in 2014. When she’s not spending time with her three dogs, she also manages the studio of a successful street artist. In 2013, she authored the book 'Street Art Stories Roma' and most recently contributed to 'Crossroads: A Glimpse Into the Life of Alice Pasquini'. You can follow her adventures online at @romephotoblog.
"In a recent interview, renowned linguist and cognitive scientist Noam Chomsky gave his thoughts on the rise of ChatGPT, and its effect on education. What he had to say wasn't favorable. As more and more educators struggle with how to combat plagiarism and the use of these chatbots in the classroom, Chomsky gives a clear viewpoint. For him, the key all lies in how students are taught, and, currently, our educational system is pushing students toward ChatGPT and other shortcuts.
“I don’t think [ChatGPT] has anything to do with education,” Chomsky tells interviewer Thijmen Sprakel of EduKitchen. “I think it’s undermining it. ChatGPT is basically high-tech plagiarism.” The challenge for educators, according to Chomsky, is to create interest in the topics that they teach so that students will be motivated to learn, rather than trying to avoid doing the work.
Chomsky, who spent a large part of his career teaching at MIT, felt strongly that his students wouldn't have turned to AI to complete their coursework because they were invested in the material. If students are relying on ChatGPT, Chomsky says it’s “a sign that the educational system is failing. If students aren’t interested, they’ll find a way around it.”
The American intellectual strongly feels like the current educational model of “teaching to test” has created an environment where students are bored. In turn, the boredom turns to avoidance, and ChatGPT becomes an easy way to avoid the education.
While some argue that chatbots like ChatGPT can be a useful educational tool, Chomsky has a much different opinion. He feels that these natural language systems “may be of value for some things, but it's not obvious what.”
Meanwhile, it appears that schools are scrambling to figure out how to counteract the use of ChatGPT. Many schools have banned ChatGPT on school devices and networks, and educators are adjusting their teaching styles. Some are turning to more in-class essays, while others are looking at how they can incorporate the technology into the classroom.
It will be interesting to see if the rise of chatbots helps steer us toward a new teaching philosophy and away from the “teaching to test” method that has become the driving force of modern education. It's the kind of education that Chomsky says was “ridiculed during the Enlightenment,” and so indirectly, this new technology may force schools to rethink how they ask students to apply their knowledge"
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A battle of the generations. Boomer vs millennial to see who can build the better table in two days.
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1. Characteristics of Chinese Ethics: Practical Focus and Closeness to Pre-theoretical Experience In the Analects 13.18, the Governor of She tells Confucius of a Straight Body who reported his father to the authorities for stealing a sheep. Confucius (Kongzi, best known in the West under his latinized name, lived in the 6th and 5th century B.C.E) replies that in his village, uprightness lies in fathers and sons covering up for each other. In the Euthyphro, Socrates encounters Euthyphro (whose name can be translated as “Straight thinker”), reputed for his religious knowledge and on his way to bring charges against his father for murder. The conversation between Socrates and Euthyphro leads to a theoretical inquiry in which various proposed answers as to piety’s ousia (essence) are probed and ultimately found unsatisfactory, but in which no answer to the piety or impiety of Euthyphro’s action is given. The contrast between these two stories highlights one of the distinctive features of Chinese ethics in general: its respect for the practical problem. The practical problem discussed by Confucius and Socrates is arguably a universal one: the conflict between loyalty owed to a family member and duty to uphold public justice within the larger community. Confucius’s response is one dimension of a characteristically Chinese respect for the practical problem. The nature of the problem demands a practical response. However, another dimension of a reflective respect for the practical problem is to maintain a certain humility in the face of a really hard problem. It is to be skeptical that highly abstract theories will provide a response that is true to the complexities of that problem. A tradition exemplifying such respect will contain influential works that will not pretend to have resolved recurring tensions within the moral life such as those identified in the Analects and the Euthyphro. Confucius gives an immediate practical answer in 13.18, but the reader and commentators have been left to weave together the various remarks about filiality (or as it is often called, “filial piety”) so as to present a rationale for that answer. These remarks quite often concern rather particular matters, as is the matter of turning in one’s father for stealing a sheep, and the implications for more general issues are ambiguous. Do fathers and sons cover up for each other on all occasions, no matter how serious, and if there is a cover-up, is there also an attempt to compensate the victim of the wrongdoing? The particularity of these passages is tied up with the emphasis on praxis. What is sought and what is discussed is often the answer to a particular practical problem, and the resulting particularity of the remarks invites multiple interpretations. The sayings often are presented as emerging from conversations between Confucius and his students or various personages with official positions, or among Confucius’s students. One passage (11.22) portrays Confucius as having tailored his advice according to the character of the particular student: he urges one student to ask father and elder brother for advice before practicing something he has learnt, while he urges the other to immediately practice; the reason is that the first has so much energy that he needs to be kept back, while the second is retiring and needs to be urged forward. With this passage in mind, we might then wonder whether the apparent tension between remarks made in connection with a concept is to be understood in terms of the differences between the individuals addressed or other aspects of the conversational context. All texts that have become canonical within a tradition, of course, are subject to multiple interpretations, but Chinese texts invite them. They invite them by articulating themes that stay relatively close to the pre-theoretical experience that gives rise to the practical problems of moral life (see Kupperman 1999 on the role of experience in Chinese philosophy). The pre-theoretical is not experience that is a pure given or unconceptualized, nor is it necessarily experience that is universal in its significance and intelligibility across different traditions of thought and culture. This attention to pre-theoretical experience also leads to differences in format and discursive form: dialogues and stories are more suited for appealing to and evoking the kind of pre-theoretical experience that inspires parts of the text. By contrast, much Western philosophy has gone with Plato in taking the route of increasing abstraction from pre-theoretical experience. The contrast is not meant to imply that Chinese philosophy fails to give rise to theoretical reflection. Theoretical reflection of great significance arises in the Mozi, Mencius, Hanfeizi, Xunzi, and Zhuangzi, but there is more frequent interplay between the theorizing and references to pre-theoretical experience. In Chinese texts there are suggestions for theorizing about this experience, but the suggestions often indicate several different and fruitful directions for theorizing to go further. These directions may seem incompatible, and they may or may not be so in the end, but the tensions between these directions are real. The result is a fruitful ambiguity that poses a problematic. Pre-theoretical experience poses a practical problem. Apparently incompatible solutions to problems are partially theorized in the text, but the apparent incompatibility is not removed. Much of the value of these texts lies in their leaving the tensions in place with enough theory given to stimulate thinking within a certain broadly defined approach. There is more than enough for the sophisticated theorist to try to interpret or to reconstruct a more defined position as an extension of that broadly defined approach. At the same time, the problematic is partly framed with the language of pre-theoretical experience in the form of dialogue and story, making the texts accessible to a much broader range of readers than is usually the case with philosophy texts. The following sections present some of the major kinds of problematic that appear in the major schools of Chinese ethical thought. 2. Confucian Ethics 2.1 Virtue ethics: the dao, the junzi, and ren A common way to understand Confucian ethics is that it is a virtue ethic. For some scholars this will be an obvious, uncontroversial truth. For others, it is a misconstrual that imposes contentious Western assumptions on Confucianism about what it is to be a person and what an ethics should be about. In light of this controversy, it is important to specify the sense in which it is relatively uncontroversial to claim that virtues constitute a major focus of attention in these texts. Virtues in the relevant sense are qualities or traits that persons could have and that are appropriate objects of aspiration to realize. These virtues go into the conception of an ideal of a kind of person that one aspires to be. Given this rather broad sense of “virtue,” it is unobjectionable to say that Confucian texts discuss ethics primarily in terms of virtues and corresponding ideals of the person. What makes the characterization of Confucianism as a virtue ethic controversial are more specific, narrower senses of “virtue” employed in Western philosophical theories. Tiwald (2018) distinguishes between something like the broad sense of virtue and a philosophical usage that confers on qualities or traits of character explanatory priority over right action and promoting good consequences. Virtue ethics in this sense is a competitor to rule deontological and consequentialist theories. There simply is not enough discussion in the Confucian texts, especially in the classical period, that is addressed to the kind of questions these Western theories seek to answer. There are other narrower senses of “virtue” that are clearly mischaracterizations when applied to Confucian ethics. Virtues might be supposed to be qualities that people have or can have in isolation from others with whom they interact or from their communities, societies, or culture. Such atomistic virtues could make up ideals of the person that in turn can be specified or realized in social isolation. Further, virtues might be supposed to be identifiable through generalizations that hold true in every case, such that the ways these traits are concretely manifested in conduct do not vary across context or situation. Prominent and influential critics of the “virtue” characterization of Confucian ethics--Roger Ames (2011, 2021) and Robert Neville (2016)--seem to be supposing that the term is loaded with such controversial presuppositions. As will become clear in subsequent discussion here, one can employ virtue language with the appropriate qualifiers and at the same time acknowledge much of what the critics claim as insights of Confucian ethics: e.g., that the process of realizing the virtues characteristically takes place in relationship to others--those to whom one has responsibilities as a son or daughter or mother or father, for example--and that it can be part of one’s very identity to be a particular person’s son or daughter, mother or father. It is part of the Confucian vision of a life befitting human beings that it is a life of relationships marked by mutual care and respect, that one achieves fullest personhood that way. One achieves this in a manner that is particular to one’s circumstances, including the particular others with whom one most interacts. None of this is inconsistent with virtue characterizations in the broad sense (for an alternative role-ethic characterization of Confucian ethics that incorporates these insights in a different way, see Ames, 2011, 2021). The most frequently discussed ideal is that of the junzi. The Chinese word originally meant “prince’s son,” but in the Analects it refers to ethical nobility. The first English translations rendered it as “gentleman,” but Ames and Rosemont (1998) have usefully suggested “exemplary person.” Among the traits connected to ethical nobility are filiality, a respect for and dedication to the performance of traditional ritual forms of conduct, and the ability to judge what the right thing to do is in the given situation. These traits are virtues in the sense that they are necessary for following the dao, the way human beings ought to live their lives. As Yu (2007) points out, the dao plays the kind of role in ancient Chinese ethics that is analogous to the role played by eudaimonia or flourishing, in ancient Greek ethics. The junzi is the ethical exemplar with the virtues making it possible to follow the dao. Besides the concepts of dao and junzi, the concept of ren is a unifying theme in the Analects. Before Confucius’s time, the concept of ren referred to the aristocracy of bloodlines, meaning something like the strong and handsome appearance of an aristocrat. But in the Analects the concept is of a moral excellence that anyone has the potential to achieve. Various translations have been given of ren. Many translations attempt to convey the idea of complete ethical virtue, connoting a comprehensive state of ethical excellence. In a number of places in the Analects the ren person is treated as equivalent to the junzi, indicating that ren has the meaning of complete or comprehensive moral excellence, lacking no particular virtue but having them all. However, ren in some places in the Analects is treated as one virtue among others such as wisdom and courage. In the narrower sense of being one virtue among others, it is explained in 12.22 in terms of caring for others. It is in light of these passages that other translators, such as D.C. Lau, 1970a, use ‘benevolence’ to translate ren. However, others have tried to more explicitly convey the sense of ‘ren’ in the comprehensive sense of all-encompassing moral virtue through use of the translation ‘Good’ or ‘Goodness’ (see Waley, 1938, 1989; Slingerland, 2003). It is possible that the sense of ren as particular virtue and the sense of comprehensive excellence are related in that attitudes such as care and respect for others may be a pervasive aspect of different forms of moral excellence, e.g., such attitudes may be expressed in ritual performance, as discussed below, or in right or appropriate action according to the context. But this suggestion is speculative, and because the very nature of ren remains so elusive, it shall be here referred to simply as‘ren’. Why is the central virtue discussed in such an elusive fashion in the Analects? The answer may lie in the role that pre-theoretical experience plays in Chinese philosophy. Tan (2005) has pointed to the number and vividness of the persons in the Analects who serve as moral exemplars. She suggests that the text invites us to exercise our imaginations in envisioning what these people might have been like and what we ourselves might become in trying to emulate them. Use of the imagination, she points out, draws our attention to the particularities of virtue and engages our emotions and desires. Amy Olberding (2008, 2012) develops the notion of exemplarism into a Confucian epistemology, according to which we get much of our important knowledge by encountering the relevant objects or persons. Upon initial contact, we may have little general knowledge of the qualities that make them so compelling to us, but we are motivated to further investigate. Confucius treated as exemplars legendary figures from the early days of the Zhou dynasty, such as the Duke of Zhou and Kings Wu and Wen. Confucius served as an exemplar to his students, perhaps of the virtue of ren, though he never claimed the virtue for himself. Book Ten of the Analects displays what might appear to be an obsessive concern with the way Confucius greeted persons in everyday life, e.g., if he saw they were dressed in mourning dress, he would take on a solemn appearance or lean forward on the stanchion of his carriage. Such concern becomes much more comprehensible if Confucius is being treated as an exemplar of virtue from which the students are trying to learn. The focus of Book Ten and elsewhere in the Analects also suggests that the primary locus of virtue is to be found in how people treat each other in the fabric of everyday life and not in the dramatic moral dilemmas so much discussed in contemporary Western moral philosophy. 2.2 The centrality of li or ritual Analects 1.15 likens the project of cultivating one’s character to crafting something fine from raw material: cutting bone, carving a piece of horn, polishing or grinding a piece of jade. The chapter also stresses the importance of li (the rites, ritual) in this project. In the Analects ritual ranges quite widely to include ceremonies of ancestor worship, the burial of parents, and customs governing respectful and appropriate behavior within the family and with friends, in everyday interactions with others in one’s village, and protocols for officials performing their duties within the court. Ritual is an exemplification of the saying that the personal is the political. It is personal in the sense that engaging in ritual, learning to perform it properly and with the right attitudes of respect and consideration while performing it, is to engage in a kind of cutting and carving and polishing and grinding of the self. One of the most distinctive marks of Confucian ethics is the centrality of ritual performance in the ethical cultivation of character. For example, while Aristotelian habituation generally corresponds to the Confucian cultivation of character, there is no comparable emphasis in Aristotle on the role of ritual performance in this process of character transformation. Ritual is also political in the sense that the right governance of a society is thought to be founded upon the appropriate conduct of relationships at all levels in a society, starting with family relationships as the foundation. As Olberding puts it, the term li covers both good manners and political civility because the Confucians did not distinguish between them: “both require interpreting situations and steering conduct to communicate respect, consideration, and toleration. Success in both will likewise often depend on developed disposition, on prior patterning that renders me more prone to one kind of response than another” (2019, 28). It is clear that in the Analects any complete description of self-cultivation must include a role for the culturally established customs that spell out what it means to express respect for another person in various social contexts. Just how that role is conceived, however, is one of the central interpretive puzzles concerning the Analects. The interpretive question of how li is central to self-cultivation is posed in particular about its relation to the chief virtue of ren. In the Analects 3.3 the Master said, “A man who is not ren—what has he to do with ritual?” The implication is that ritual is a means of cultivating and expressing a ren that is already there, at least in a raw or unrefined state. This implication about the role of ritual is consistent with passages of the Analects in which Confucius shows flexibility on the question of whether to follow established ritual practice. 9.3 shows him accepting the contemporary practice of wearing a cheaper silk ceremonial cap rather than the traditional linen cap. 9.3 also shows Confucius rejecting the contemporary practice of bowing after one ascends the stairs leading up to the ruler’s dais, and maintaining the traditional practice of bowing before one ascends the stairs. The implication is that the contemporary practice expresses the wrong attitude toward the ruler—presumptuousness in assuming permission to ascend. 9.3 suggests that it is something like the right attitude that is cultivated and expressed by ritual. Kwong-loi Shun (1993) has called this kind of understanding of ritual the “instrumental” interpretation. However, in other places of the Analects, ritual seems to take on a more central role in the achievement of ren. Indeed, it seems to be presented as the key. A very common translation of 12.1 has Confucius telling his favorite student Yan Hui that “Restraining yourself and returning to the rites constitutes ren. If for one day you managed to restrain yourself and return to the rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to ren. The key to achieving ren lies within yourself—how could it come from others?” (translation from Slingerland, 2003, though see Li, 2007, for a different translation of the word wei usually translated as ‘constitutes’, with different implications for the question of the relation between li and ren). Such passages have given rise to the “definitionalist” interpretation, as Shun calls it, which makes li definitive of the whole of ren. Obviously the instrumental and definitional interpretations cannot both be true. One possibility for resolving this tension is to construe Confucius’ remarks as directed towards a particular student and informed by his conception of what sort of advice that student needs to hear given his strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps Confucius believes that Yan Hui should be focusing on disciplining himself through observing the rites, but his advice should not be be taken as an intended generalization about the relationship between ren and li. Perhaps the remarks that suggest more of an instrumentalist construal of the relationship are similarly context and audience bound. Such interpretation, of course, leaves open the question of what that relationship is, or indeed, whether Confucius ever had in mind a generalization about the relationship that informed his remarks. Some have argued that such serious conflicts within the text constitute reasons for thinking that the Analects is an accretive text, i.e., composed of layers added at different times by different people with conflicting views. To some extent, viewing the Analects as accretive is nothing new, but Bruce and A. Takeo Brooks (1998, 2000) have taken that view very far by identifying Book 4 (and only part of it, for that matter) as the most reflective of the historical Kongzi’s views, and the other books as stemming from Confucius’s students and members of his family. The different books, and, sometimes, individual passages within the books, represent different time periods, people, with different agendas who are responding to different conditions, and often putting forward incompatible strands of Confucianism. The Brooks suggest that the parts of the Analects most directly associated with the historical Confucius and his disciples are the parts that feature ren as the pre-eminent virtue and that de-emphasize the role of ritual. The parts that are due to another trend in Confucianism, headed by Confucius’s descendants, are the parts that elevate ritual as the key to ren. The Brooks’s theory of the Analects has drawn appreciation and disagreement (e.g., see Slingerland, 2000 for both). It threatens to dislodge the assumption that underlies the dominant mode of interpreting the Analects, which is that the text, or most of it, reflects the coherent thought of one person. Tao Jiang (2022) distinguishes between the sinological approach of the kind done by the Brooks and the approach of philosophers that focuses on the “influential received text” which presents to the reader a “textual author,” e.g., a Confucius, to whom authorial intent is attributed through the sayings and ideas in the text. The philosopher investigates this textual object as part of a lengthy and highly influential philosophical and cultural tradition that often deploys texts to address problems of contemporary concern. A third approach, different from though in some respects simiar to the second, is to acknowledge the real possibility that different sets of passages are the products of different thinkers, but also to hold that these different thinkers might have employed different but philosophically substantial perspectives on common problems. One of those problems might indeed have been the relation between ren and li, and at least part of the explanation of why different and potentially conflicting things are said about that relation is that the relation is a difficult one to figure out and that different thinkers addressing that common problem might reasonably have arrived at different things to say. Whether these different things are ultimately irreconcilable remains an open question. This third approach merges with the second if one is open to the possibility that the “textual author” could be conceived as being of more than one mind as to how to solve the problem in question. This, after all, is a plausible thing to say about some philosophers of whom we are pretty sure that they were the single authors of the texts under study. One might take a constructive attitude to the different possible solutions, ask what good philosophical reasons could motivate the different approaches, and determine whether there is a way of reconciling what all the good reasons entail. If not, one can ask what might be the best solution, all things considered. Kwong-loi Shun’s approach to the ren and li is compatible with the third approach. Shun holds that on the one hand, a particular set of ritual forms are the conventions that a community has evolved, and without such forms attitudes such as respect or reverence cannot be made intelligible or expressed (reasons in favor of the definitionalist interpretation). In this sense, li constitutes ren within or for a given community. On the other hand, different communities may have different conventions that express respect or reverence, and moreover any given community may revise its conventions in piecemeal though not wholesale fashion (reasons in favor of the instrumentalist interpretation). Chenyang Li (2007) proposes a different approach based on a different reading of the word ‘wei’ used in 12.1 and often translated as ‘constitutes’ to render the crucial line, “Restraining yourself and returning to the rites constitutes ren.” Li notes that a common meaning of the word is ‘make’ or ‘result in.’ The relation between li and ren need not be construed as either definitional or constitutive, nor need it be construed as purely instrumental. Li proposes that li functions something like a cultural grammar where ren is like mastery of the culture. Mastery of a language entails mastery of its grammar but not vice versa. Both Shun and Li are striving to capture a way in which ren does not reduce to li but also a way in which li is more than purely instrumental to the realization of ren. There are good philosophical reasons for this move. Consider the reasons for resisting the reduction of ren to li. As indicated above, 9.3 suggests that the attitudes of respect and reverence that are expressed by ritual forms are not reducible to any particular set of such forms, and Shun has a point in arguing that such attitudes could be expressed by different sets of such forms as established by different communities. In studying the cultures of other communities, we recognize that certain customs are meant to signify respect, even if we do not share these customs, just as we recognize that something that does not signify disrespect in our culture does indeed so signify in another culture. The fact that we can distinguish the attitude from the ritual forms that we use to express them allows us to consider alternative ritual forms that could express the same or similar attitude. Ceremonial caps that are made of more economical material are acceptable, perhaps, because wearing such caps do not affect the spirit of the ceremony. By contrast, bowing after one ascends the stairs constitutes an unacceptable change in attitude. To maintain that particular ritual forms do not define the respect and reverence they are intended to express is not to underestimate their importance for cultivating and strengthening these attitudes. Acting in ways that express respect given the conventionally established meanings of accepted ritual forms helps to strengthen the agent’s disposition to have respect. The ethical development of character does involve strengthening some emotional dispositions over others, and we strengthen dispositions by acting on them. By providing conventionally established, symbolic ways to express respect for others, ritual forms give participants ways to act on and therefore to strengthen the right dispositions. The cultivating function of observing ritual highlights the distinctive practical focus of Confucian ethics. It is every bit as concerned with how to acquire the right sort of character as it is with what the right sort is. On the other hand, there is good reason to resist the reduction of li simply to the role of expressing and cultivating a set of attitudes and emotional dispositions. In his influential interpretation (1972) of the Analects, Herbert Fingarette construes ritual performance as an end in itself, as beautiful and dignified, open and shared participation in ceremonies that celebrate human community. Ritual performance, internalized so that it becomes second nature, such that it is gracefully and spontaneously performed, is a crucial constituent of a fully realized human life. There are nonconventional dimensions of what it is to show respect, such as providing food for one’s parents (see Analects 2.7), but the particular way the agent does this will be deeply influenced by custom. Indeed, custom specifies what is a respectful way of serving food. On the Confucian view, doing so in a graceful and whole-hearted fashion as spelled out by the customs of one’s community is part of what it is to live a fully human life. Ritual constitutes an important part of what ren is, and hence it is not merely an instrument for refining the substance of ren. At the same time it is not the whole of ren. Consider that part of ren that involves attitudinal dispositions. Attitude is not reducible to ritual form even if acting on that form can cultivate and sustain attitude. Moreover, 7.30 emphasizes the connection between desire for ren and its achievement (“If I simply desire ren, I find that it is already there”). The achievement of ren is of course a difficult and long journey, and so 7.30 implies that coming to truly desire it lies at the heart of that achievement. The multifaceted nature of ren emerges in Book 12, where Confucius is portrayed as giving different descriptions of ren. In 12.1, as already noted, he says that ritual makes for ren. But then in 12.2, he says that ren involves comporting oneself in public as if one were receiving an important guest and in the management of the common people behaving as if one were overseeing a great sacrifice (the duty to be respectful toward others). 12.2 also associates ren with shu or “sympathetic understanding,” not imposing on others what you yourself do not desire. Here the emphasis is not so much on ritual or not exclusively anyway, but on the attitudes one displays toward others, and on the ability to understand what others want or do not want based on projecting oneself into their situation. In 12.3, when asked about ren, Confucius says that ren people are hesitant to speak (suggesting that such people take extreme care not to have their words exceed their actions). And then in 12.22, when asked about ren, Confucius says that it is to care for people. Such diverse characterizations are appropriate if ren is complete ethical virtue or comprehensive excellence that includes many dimensions, including but not reducing to the kinds of excellence associated with li. If we take the relevant passages on li and ren as forming a whole in which a coherent view is embedded, there is a pretty good case for regarding the observance of ritual propriety as a constituent of ren as well as crucial for instrumentally realizing some other dimensions of ren. But it does not exhaust the substance of ren. If the text is as radically accretive as the Brooks maintain, then the proposed construal of the relation is more of a reconstruction of what the best philosophical position might be on the nature of the relation. The reconstructive possibility should not be disturbing as long as we recognize it for what it is. Thinkers within a complex and vigorous tradition frequently re-interpret, expand, develop, revise, and even reject some of what one has inherited from the past. The fact that the Analects itself might be a product of this kind of engagement might usefully be taken as encouragement for its present students to engage with the text in the same way. The Confucian position on the importance of li in ethical cultivation is interesting and distinctive in its own right, and this is partly because Confucianism hews close to a kind of pre-theoretical experience of the moral life that might otherwise get obscured by a more purely theoretical approach to ethics. If we look at everyday experience of the moral life, we see that much of the substance of ethically significant attitudes such as respect is in fact given by cultural norms and practices, and learning a morality must involve learning these norms and practices. Children learn what their behavior means to others, and what it should mean, by learning how to greet each other, make requests, and answer requests, all in a respectful manner. Much of our everyday experience of moral socialization lies in the absorption of or teaching to others of customs that are conventionally established to mean respect, gratitude, and other ethically significant attitudes (see Olberding, 2016, 2019). So construed, Confucian ethics provides an alternative to understanding the nature of the moral life that is different from an understanding that is primarily based on abstract principles, even abstract principles that require respect for each person. This is why there is significant resonance between Confucianism and communitarian philosophies such as those defended by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 1989) and Michael Walzer (1983). One of the distinctive marks of communitarianism is the theme that much of the substance of a morality is given not in abstract principles of the sort typically defended in modern Western philosophy but in a society’s specific customs and practices. In the Analects, the ambiguous relation between ren and li poses the problematic of how we are to understand the relation between cultural norms and practices on the one hand and that part of morality that appears to transcend any particular set of norms and practices. The Analects suggests a large role for culture, but on the reading suggested here, not a definitional role. There is much room for theoretical elaboration on the nature of that role. Furthermore, in understanding why Confucians take a life of ritual practice to be partly constitutive of a fully human life, one must understand the aesthetic dimension of their notion of a fully human life. Such a life is lived as a beautiful and graceful coordinated interaction with others according to conventionally established forms that express mutual respect. A good part of the value attached to the fully human life lies in the aesthetic dimensions of a “dance” (Ihara, 2004) one performs with others. To better understand why the moral and the aesthetic cannot be cleanly separated in Confucian ethics, consider that a graceful and whole-hearted expression of respect can be beautiful precisely because it reflects the extent that the agent has made this moral attitude part of their second nature. The beauty has a moral dimension. Both these themes—the importance of contextualized moral judgment and aesthetic value of human interaction according to custom and tradition—offer opportunities for practitioners of, say, Anglo-American moral philosophy to reflect on what their approaches to the moral life might miss. 2.3 Ren and li as relational values in contrast to values of individual autonomy Consider ren in its meaning as the particular virtue of caring for others and li in its aspect as the valued human dance. These values are the basis for characterizing Confucian ethics as a relational ethic, meaning that it is in part distinguished by its placement of relationships at the center of a well-lived life (see Ames, 2011, 2021). Confucian ethics are often taken to stand in contrast to ethics that place individual autonomy and freedom to choose how to live. While there is much that is true about this contrast, it must be carefully described so as to differentiate it from some other contrasts. For example, the value of individual autonomy usually includes several different dimensions that do not necessarily accompany one another: (1) prioritizing of individual interests over group or collective interests when these conflict; (2) giving moral permission to the individual to choose from a significantly wide range (within certain moral boundaries) of ways to live; and (3) emphasizing the importance of living according to one’s own understanding of what is right and good even if others do not see it the same way. Confucian ethics in significant part, though not in all parts, accepts autonomy in the sense of (3) (see Shun, 2004; and Brindley, 2010). Confucius is often depicted in the Analects as emphasizing the importance of cultivating one’s own character even when others do not recognize or appreciate one’s efforts (e.g., 4.14) and of acting independently of what is conventionally approved or disapproved (e.g., 5.1). The texts associated with Mencius (Mengzi, best known in the West under his Latinized name, lived in the 4th century B.C.E.) and Xunzi (4th and 3rd centuries B.C.E.), the most pivotal thinkers in the classical Confucian tradition after Confucius, both articulate the necessity to speak up when one believes the ruler one is serving is on a wrong course of action (e.g., Mencius 1A3 and Xunzi 29.2). On the other hand, none of these classical thinkers argue for the necessity of protecting a frank subordinate from a ruler who is made angry by criticism, and it could be argued that Confucianism does not fully endorse autonomy in sense (3) without endorsing such protection for those who wish to engage in moral criticism of the powerful. Most interpretations present Confucian ethics as rejecting (2). There is a way for human beings to live, a comprehensive human good to be realized, and there can be no choosing between significantly different ways of life that are equally acceptable from a moral perspective (an important exception to this kind of interpretation is provided by Hall and Ames, 1987, who interpret Confucius’s dao as a human invention, collective and individual). On the other hand, Confucian ethics de-emphasizes legal coercion as a method for guiding people along the way and instead emphasizes moral exhortation and inspiration by way of example (see, most famously, 2.3 of the Analects, which emphasizes the necessity of a ruler’s guiding his people by instilling in them a sense of shame rather than by the threat of external punishment). While a Confucian might believe in a single correct way for human beings, they might endorse a significant degree of latitude for people to learn from their own mistakes and by way of example from others (see Chan, 1999). Confucian ethics does not accept (1), but not because it subordinates individual interests to group or collective interests (for criticism of the rather common interpretation of Confucianism as prioritizing the group over the individual, see Hall and Ames 1998). Rather, there is a different conception of the relationship between individual and group interests. The best illustration of this different conception is a story to be found in the Mencius that concerns sage-king Shun. When Shun wanted to marry, he knew that his father, influenced by his stepmother, would not allow him to marry. In this difficult situation, Shun decided to marry without telling his father, even though he is renowned for his filiality. Mencius in fact defends the filiality of Shun’s act in 5A2. He observes that Shun knew that he would not have been allowed to marry if he told his father. This would have resulted in bitterness toward his parents, and that is why he did not tell them. The implication of this version of Shun’s reason is that filiality means preserving an emotionally viable relationship with one’s parents, and in the case at hand Shun judged that it would have been worse for the relationship to have asked permission to marry. The conception of the relation between individual and group interests embodied in this story is not one of subordination of one to the other but about the mutual dependence between the individual and the group. The individual depends on the group and must make the group’s interests part of their own interests, but, on the other side of the equation, the group depends on the individual and must make that individual’s interests part of the group’s interests. Shun’s welfare depends on his family and therefore must make his family’s interests part of his own (he resolves to do what is necessary to preserve his relationship to his parents), but his family’s welfare depends on Shun, and therefore it must recognize his interests to constitute part of its welfare (the family must recognize that it is damaging itself in requiring Shun to deny himself the most part important of human relationships). The way that Confucianism conceives of the relationship between the individual and the group, as well as the way it is typically misconceived, is reflected in its notion of harmony or he. A typical misconception of harmony as a Confucian value is that it involves agreement and conformity with the views of others. In Analects 13.23, however, Confucius says that the junzi pursues harmony rather than sameness, while the small person does the opposite. The pre-Confucian thinker Yan Ying expresses a similar idea about harmony in likening it to a soup made with meat or fish, the strong flavor of which must be balanced and complemented by other ingredients such as vinegar, sauce, salt, and plum (Zuozhuan, Duke Zhao, 20th year; see Legge 1960 translation). The metaphor is meant to convey the idea that a ruler will not seek only ministers who agree with him but will seek to reconcile a diversity of viewpoints from his ministers. Reconciliation not only involves acceptance of difference but also acceptance of a degree of tension and conflict, even if one seeks to reduce the latter from dangerous levels (Li 2014; Wong 2020) to achieve a productive equilibrium. Moreover, that equilibrium is dynamic and is continuously created and re-created. Success in achieving a satisfactory equilibrium is never guaranteed. Confucian ethics draws much of its appeal and power from its placing at the center of our attention the human desire for connection with others. At the same time, satisfying connections can be surprisingly fragile and subject to both predictable and unpredictable conflict. Acting in accordance with li and cultivating one’s dispositions for respect and tolerance of others is a way of making desired relationships more fruitful and less alienating (Olberding 2019). However, we have limited control over what others do and over what happens to them. As a result, the most satisfying relationships also make us exceedingly vulnerable when they break or are lost through separation and death. We may never be the same persons when such loss occurs, and a continuing concern of the Confucian tradition is how to reckon with such loss when one’s identity as a person includes significant others and our moral commitments to them (for a discussion of how this is treated in the Confucian tradition, with connections drawn to feminist analyses of the way our ties to others makes for value and vulnerability, see Ing 2017). The wholeness and integrity of one’s relational identity may be threatened with disintegration upon the loss of these others, or when one’s multiple attachments present conflicting and possibly irreconcilable demands on the self. Ing (2017) points out that the Confucian tradition as a whole produced different points of view on whether it was always possible to deal successfully with threats to the integrity of the self. One point of view, which might be reasonably attributed to the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi, is that there is always a way to preserve one’s integrity if one is wise and able enough. Ing articulates another point of view elsewhere defended in the Confucian tradition, to the effect that there are inherently tragic situations in which no option could be said to be right or best. This second possibility resonates with one defended in contemporary Western moral and political philosophy by philosophers such as Michael Walzer (1973). 2.4 Filiality and care with distinctions in Confucian ethics Along with the emphasis on li, the centrality of filiality is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Confucian ethics. The Analects 2.6 says to give parents no cause for anxiety other than illness, whereas 2.7, as mentioned earlier, emphasizes the need for the material support of parents to be carried out in a respectful manner. 2.8 emphasizes that it is the expression on one’s face that is filial and not just taking on the burden of work or letting elders partake of the wine and food before others. Is obedience to parents always required of the filial child? What if the child believes that parents are wrong and their wishes run contrary to what is right or to ren? In those cases where one thinks them wrong, what is one to do? The Analects 2.5 portrays Confucius as saying, “Do not disobey,” but when queried further as to his meaning, he explains obedience in terms of conformance to the rites for burying and sacrificing to deceased parents. In 4.18 Confucius says that when one disagrees with one’s parents, one should remonstrate with them gently. Most translations of what follows have Confucius concluding that if parents are not persuaded, one should not oppose them (e.g., Lau, 1979; Slingerland, 2003; Waley, 1938), but it is possible to read the spare and ambiguously worded passage as requiring instead that one not abandon one’s purpose in respectfully trying to change one’s parents’ minds (Legge, 1971; see Huang, 2013, 133–137 for a survey of the different interpretations and an argument for the persistence-in-remonstrating translation). In other Confucian texts, the question of whether obedience is required has received different answers in the Confucian tradition. Chapters 1 and 2 of the Record of Ritual (Legge, 1967, vol. 1) say that one must obey if one fails to persuade one’s parent. On the other hand, Xunzi declares that following the requirements of morality rather than the wishes of one’s father is part of the highest standard of conduct (29.1 of the Xunzi; for a translation see Knoblock, 1988–94; or Hutton 2014) and moreover that if following the course of action mandated by one’s father would bring disgrace to the family and not following it would bring honor, then not following is to act morally (29.2 of the Xunzi). Xunzi’s position is supported in part by the distinction between service to parents and obedience to them. It might very well fail to be of service to parents if following their wishes is to bring moral disgrace to them and the family. Another ethical issue arising from the strong Confucian emphasis on filiality concerns possible conflicts between loyalty to parents and loyalty to the ruler or public justice. Consider again Analects 13.18, in which Confucius says that uprightness is found in sons and fathers covering up for each other. In this case, at least, loyalty to parents or to children takes precedence over loyalty to ruler or to public justice. This precedence is one implication of the Confucian doctrine of care with distinctions (“love with distinctions” is a frequent translation, but perhaps “care with distinctions” is less misleading because it covers both the emotionally freighted attitude toward kin and a more distanced attitude toward strangers). Though all people are owed moral concern, some are owed more than others, according to the agent’s relationship to them. Jiang (2021) argues that much of the dynamic development of classical Chinese philosophy springs from a tension between values of humaneness based on special relationships such as family membership, on the one hand, and on the other hand, impartial values such as justice, a tension that surfaces in the Analects. The Confucian response to this tension divides, he suggests, between two streams: an “extensionist” approach that sees the two kinds of value as ultimately compatible, and a “sacrificialist” approach that focuses on the conflict between them and prioritizes humaneness. An alternative reading of the tradition that does not put the tension quite so much at the center would not construe the relationship between humaneness and justice as inherently conflictual: after all, the Confucians recognized that family loyalty is the foundation for the development of moral concern for the welfare of others outside the family and at the same time that circumstances can bring the two kinds of value into conflict. In any case, it seems right to see the relationship between these values and the different ways that thinkers reacted to that relationship as a fertile source of newly developing streams of thought. This issue works into understanding the thought of a pivotal critic of Confucianism in the classical period. Mozi (probably 5th century B.C.E), who possibly was once a student of Confucianism, came to reject that teaching, partly on the grounds that the Confucian emphasis on ritual and musical performance was a wasteful expenditure of resources that could otherwise be used to meet the basic needs of the many (Mozi, for a translation, see Books 25, 32 in Fraser 2020). A related criticism in the text of the Mozi is that tradition does not hold normative authority simply because it is tradition, for there was a time when the practice in question was not tradition but new (Book 39 in Fraser). If a practice has no authority when it is new, it has no authority at any subsequent time simply because it is getting older. Mozi also argued that exclusive concern for one’s own (oneself, one’s family, one’s state) is at the root of all destructive conflict (Book 16 in Fraser). Exclusive concern for the self causes the strong to rob the weak. Exclusive concern for one’s family causes great families to wreak havoc on lesser families (it is not difficult to see how this thought might apply to the idea of protecting one’s own, even if they have committed serious crimes against others outside the family). Exclusive concern toward one’s state causes great states to attack small states. Mozi advocated the doctrine of jian ai as a remedy. “Ai” usually means “love” or “affection,” but for Mozi it probably meant an emotionally cooler form of concern. “Jian” usually means “inclusive.” One possible translation of “jian ai” is “inclusive care” (see Fraser, 2016). Other translations render “jian” as “impartial,” as in “impartial care” (see Ivanhoe 2005). The latter translation conveys clearly the understanding that Confucians, at least since Mencius, have had of jian ai, which is that it requires one to have equal concern for everyone regardless of one’s relationship to them. The next section explains how Mencius incorporated this understanding of jian ai in his criticism of it and in his development of Confucian ethics. 2.5 Mencius’s defense of care with distinctions and his theory of the roots of moral knowledge and motivation in human nature The substantial following that Mohism gained in the classical period forced a response from Confucians (see Hansen, 1992, and Van Norden 2007, for a discussion of Mozi’s pivotal impact on the Chinese tradition). They responded on two subjects: first, they had to address what is required by way of concern for all people and how to reconcile such concern with the greater concern for some that the Confucian doctrine of care with distinctions requires; second, they had to address the question of what kinds of concern are motivationally possible for human beings, partly in response to the Mohist argument that it is not difficult to act on jian ai (which they came to interpret as being contrary to care with distinctions), and partly in response to others who were skeptical about the possibility of acting on any kind of genuinely other-regarding concern. Mencius, in the text purporting to be a record of his teachings, explicitly sets himself to the task of defending Confucianism not only against Mohism but the teachings of Yang Zhu. Yang’s teachings seemed to Mencius to sit on the opposite end of the spectrum from Mohism (there is no surviving text purporting to articulate and defend Yangism). According to Mencius’s characterization, Yang Zhu criticized both Mohism and Confucianism for asking people to sacrifice themselves for others. Yang Zhu on this view was an ethical egoist: i.e., one who holds that it is always right to promote one’s own welfare. Mencius positioned Confucianism as the occupying the correct mean between the extremes of having concern only for oneself on the one hand and having an equal degree of concern for everyone. Mencius 1A7 purports to be an account of a conversation between Mencius and King Xuan, the ruler of a Chinese state. Mencius is attempting to persuade the king to adopt the Confucian dao or way of ruling. The king wonders whether he really can be the kind of king Mencius is advocating, and Mencius replies by asking whether the following story he has heard about the king is true. The story is that the king saw an ox being led to slaughter for a ritual sacrifice. The king decided to spare the ox and substituted a lamb for the ritual sacrifice. Thinking back on that occasion, the king recalls that it was the look in the ox’s eyes, like that of an innocent man being led to execution, that led him to substitute the lamb. Mencius then comments that this story demonstrates the king’s capability to become a true king, and that all he has to do is to extend the sort of compassion he showed the ox to his own people. To say that he can care for an ox but not for his people is like saying “my strength is sufficient to lift heavy weight, but not enough to lift a feather” (translation adapted from Lau, 1970a) His failure to act on behalf of his people is due simply to his not acting, not to an inability to act. What the king has to do, suggests Mencius, is to treat the aged in his family as aged, and then extend it to the aged in other families; treat his young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of others; then he can turn the whole world in the palm of his hand. The passage demonstrates one characteristic of the text that is pertinent to Mencius’s response to Mohism and quite possibly its influence on him. In contrast to the Analects, the ruler’s duties to care for his people are more frequently discussed and play a more prominent role in the conception of a ruler’s moral excellence. Mencius is portrayed in this text as very much engaged in getting the kings of Chinese states to stop mistreating their subjects, to stop drafting their subjects into their wars of territorial expansion, and to avoid overtaxing them to finance their wars and lavish projects. At the same time, Mencius’s assertion that the king is able to extend the kind of concern he showed the ox toward his own people is a reply to those who advocate Yangism on the grounds that acting for one’s own sake is natural. Mencius holds that natural compassion is a part of human nature. The task of moral self-cultivation is the task of “extending” what is natural. What is natural, or at least more so, is properly acting toward the aged and the young in one’s family and then extending that to the aged and the young in other families. Extension is necessary because natural compassion is uneven compared to where it ought to extend. King Xuan may find it natural to have compassion for an innocent man about to be executed or a terrified ox about to be slaughtered, but not toward all his subjects when he is focusing on the benefits that a war of territorial expansion might bring him. This story of Mencius, the King, and the ox is rich material for reflection on the nature of moral development. It seems plausible that development must begin with something that is of the right nature to be shaped into the moral virtues, and also plausible that what we begin with is not as it fully should be. The questions posed by the story is what the natural basis of morality is and how further development occurs. Mencius’s theory of the “four duan” addresses these questions. “Duan” literally means “tip of something” and is often translated as “beginnings” in this context. What are the four beginnings of morality? In 2A6 human nature (ren xing) it is said that no person is devoid of a heart (the word for heart in Chinese stands for the seat of thinking and feeling, hence often translated as “the mind”) sensitive to the suffering of others, and to illustrate this beginning, Mencius asks us to suppose that a man were suddenly to see a young child about to fall into a well. Such a man would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. This natural compassion can develop into the virtue of ren (in Mencius, ren is more often a particular virtue that concerns caring and hence is often translated as “benevolence” or “humaneness”). A second beginning is the heart that feels shame in certain situations, e.g., in 6A10, Mencius says that if rice and soup are offered after being trampled upon, even a beggar would disdain them. Under the right conditions, innate shame develops into the virtue of yi or righteousness—being able to do the right thing and dedication to doing it. The third beginning is the heart that feels courtesy,e.g., the younger sometimes instinctively knows to respect and be courteous to the older. Under the right conditions, courtesy develops into li, which as a virtue consists in the observance of the rites or the virtue of ritual propriety. And finally, there is the heart that can make morally relevant distinctions (shi/fei, the thing to do or not to do). Under the right conditions, this sense of approval and disapproval develops into wisdom, which includes having a grasp of the spirit behind moral rules so that one knows how to be flexible in applying them. It is important to note that Mencian beginnings of morality are not just blind feelings or primitive urges to act in certain ways, but contain within them certain intuitive judgments about what is right and wrong, what is to be disdained and what is deferential, respectful behavior. In the example of the beggar who does not accept food that has been trampled upon, it seems that Mencius is suggesting we have an original, unlearned sense that allows us to judge the sort of respect that is due to ourselves as human beings. Similarly, in suggesting that we have an unlearned sense of deference, Mencius is suggesting that we have an unlearned sense of what is due to others such as elders and our parents. Mencius’s theory tallies with some of the more recent theories of emotion that point toward the intertwining of cognitive and affective dimensions (the theory does not necessarily imply, however, that the affective amounts to nothing more than the cognitive, as shall be discussed later). The Mencius contains different metaphors that convey a view of human nature as the basis for moral development. On one metaphor, used in a debate with rival philosopher Gaozi in 6A2, the inborn goodness of human nature is like the tendency of water to flow downward. The metaphor implies that human beings develop virtues in the absence of abnormal interference such as water being damned up or struck so that it splashes upward. On the other way of conceiving ethical development, the four beginnings are more like barley sprouts that need nurture analogous to sun, water, and fertile soil (6A7). Mencius seems to treat the the two conceptions as equivalent, but arguably they are are significantly different since the “growing” conditions for the sprouts are not necessarily provided in the normal course of affairs (see Wong, 2015b). In some passages, extension is characterized as a matter of simply preserving or not losing what is given to one at birth (4B12, 4B19, 4B28,
First of all, what is feedback? Feedback is a practice helping to improve an individual's performance by identifying her or his successes as well as some
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Artist Brian Peterson paints his neighbors experiencing homelessness and uses the money from sold portraits to support them in achieving their hopes and …
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"Jul 26, 2023 "The recent verdict in a Quebec court case of Gabriel Sohier-Chaput, a 36-year-old Montrealer who wrote articles willfully promoting hate against Jews in The Daily Stormer, a prominent American Neo-Nazi website, has sparked an urgent and necessary conversation about hate speech and inadequate punitive measures in addressing this issue....
A precursor oftentimes to discrimination, harassment, and physical violence, hate speech poses significant dangers not only to targeted individuals or communities, but to the fundamental values of our society. Hate speech is a destructive force that not only undermines individual dignity, but also threatens the fabric of societal harmony.
In a multicultural nation like Canada, the propagation of hate speech stands in stark contrast to our core values and legal principles, particularly the right to freedom from discrimination, under Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Of particular concern, we know that online hate can turn into real-world violence. Left unchecked, this is how antisemitism is normalized and weaponized.
The proposed three-month jail sentence by the Crown in this case is woefully insufficient. Such a brief punishment downplays the serious nature of the crime and fails to serve as an effective deterrent against similar criminal behavior. Sentencing in a criminal case should have multiple objectives: punishing the offender, deterring others, and providing an opportunity for rehabilitation.
Such a lenient sentence lacks proportionality as it sends an incorrect message about the seriousness of the offence and fails to deter others, who see that the consequences for such crimes are minimal, from committing similar offences. Accordingly, this sentence may actually embolden more hate speech and more hate crimes. In addition, such short sentencing prevents criminals from preparing adequately for their reintegration into society, therefore casting serious doubts on the authenticity of their rehabilitation and posing serious risks to the public, especially members of Canada’s Jewish community who remain the most targeted religious minority for hate crimes in our country. To his credit, Judge Del Negro called Sohier-Chaput "extremely dangerous to the public."
Indeed, the Quebec court case provides a crucial opportunity to examine the efficacy of our current sentencing practices. In this context, the recommended three-month jail sentence sends a troubling message that the harm caused by hate speech is trivial and not worthy of greater sentencing and could set a dangerous precedent. Furthermore, it fails to recognize the profound societal and individual impacts of hate speech, in this case of the Jewish community, and risks the trivialization of this grave offence.
Hate speech is a serious offence that requires a robust response from our justice system. With sentencing taking place on September 22, the sentencing guidelines must be reassessed to reflect the gravity of hate speech so that we can strengthen the protection of our diverse society and reaffirm our commitment to upholding the values of inclusivity and tolerance that define our nation. This case serves as a clarion call of the potential harm that hate speech poses and our responsibility to respond appropriately, fostering the hope that it will catalyze a deeper examination of hate speech penalties in Canada.
Jade Levitt, Director of Quebec, HonestReporting Canada and Samuel Malamud, Social Media Intern, HonestReporting Canada