Can you trust Tor's entry guards? | TOR | ICT Security-Sécurité PC et Internet | Scoop.it
Eight years ago researcher Dan Egerstad demonstrated how useful having your own Tor exit nodes can be if you want to spy on people by setting up five of his own.

He used them to harvest thousands of emails and messages from embassies in Australia, Japan, Iran, India and Russia, as well as the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Indian Ministry of Defence.

He was running exit nodes rather than entry guards but his conclusion applies to both - he was convinced (although he provided no proof of it) that governments would surely be running or spying on Tor relays too:

I am absolutely positive that I am not the only one to figure this out ... I'm pretty sure there are governments doing the exact same thing. There's probably a reason why people are volunteering to set up a node.


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